How to Control Controlled School Choice by Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin
HOW TO CONTROL CONTROLLED SCHOOL CHOICE
ONLINE APPENDIX
FEDERICO ECHENIQUE AND M. BUMIN YENMEZ
Appendix B. Controlled school choice in the US
The legal background on diversity in school admissions is complicated. Since
the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of Education supreme court ruling, which
ended school segregation, many school districts have attempted to achieve
more integrated schools. The current legal environment is summarized in
the 2011 guidelines issued by the US departments of justice and education:
“Guidance on the voluntary use of race to achieve diversity and avoid racial
isolation in elementary and secondary schools.” (There is a separate set of
guidelines for college admissions.) We shall not summarize these guidelines
here, but suffice it to say that they are perfectly compatible with the theory
developed in this paper.
In particular, the “race neutral” approaches described in the guidelines can
be carried out through our methods (race neutrality goes into the definition
of types). We proceed to briefly describe some of the best-known programs in
the US.
B.1. Chicago. We illustrate the implications of our results by discussing the
case of public high schools in Chicago (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013; Kominers
and So¨nmez, 2012). The point of this exercise is to illustrate why our results,
and more generally the axiomatic method adopted here, are useful in practical
mechanism design.
Chicago uses a rule that is very close to reserves, and can therefore be
understood in terms of some of our axioms. In fact, the relatively minor
difference between reserves and the Chicago rule provides an opportunity for
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discussing how our axioms can be used to evaluate a system that is already in
place, and how it can be modified.
Selective Enrollment High Schools in Chicago have an affirmative action
policy using socioeconomic status that divides students into four types: Tier
1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4. Any given high school has 30% of its seats open;
assigned purely based on students’ priority. The remaining seats are divided
into four equal categories, each reserved for a particular tier. Students are
ordered in terms of priorities, and they are selected in that order to apply to
schools. A student submits a preference over schools, and gets assigned to her
most preferred school that still has space for her. When she is assigned to a
school, she occupies an open seat, if one is available. If no seat is available,
then she occupies a reserved seat.1
The Chicago model can be thought of as our reserves system, with the
difference that open seats are allocated before reserved seats. In terms of our
results, we can trace the difference between Chicago and reserves to the fact
that the Chicago rule violates the axiom of saturated -compatibility. We can
illustrate the situation using a simple example, in which there are four students
and one school: S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. The first three students are of one type
(t = 1) and the second two are of another type (t = 2). The school has a
capacity of q = 3; so that one seat is open, one is reserved for t = 1, and one
is reserved for t = 2. Students’ priorities are
s1  s4  s5  s2  s3.
When S = {s1, s2, s4, s5} apply, the reserves rule would assign students s1, s4
and s5 to the school, leaving out the weakest student in S, s2. The Chicago
rule would instead assign s1, s2 and s4 to the school. This is a violation of
saturated -compatibility because the lower-priority student s2 is accepted
over the higher-priority student s5, even though type t = 1 is saturated in
{s1, s2, s4, s5}.2
1This mechanism is a special case of SOSM.
2For the Chicago rule, type t = 1 is saturated in S = {s1, s2, s4, s5} because S′ =
{s2, s3, s4, s5} has the same number of type t = 1 students as in S and from S′ only one
type t = 1 student is chosen.
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In practice, the system in Chicago seems to seek diversity goals over and
above those expressed by the number of reserved seats. The simulations
in Kominers and So¨nmez (2012) suggest that the Chicago rule favors low-
socioeconomic tiers more than a system of reserves based on the same number
of reserved seats. A recent article in the Chicago Tribune gives anecdotal ev-
idence in the same direction.3 Such results, favoring one type over another,
depend on the details of the actual score (priority) distributions for different
types. The details of the score distributions are complicated to both fam-
ilies and policy makers. It may be more transparent and predictable, and
therefore better policy, to achieve those goals through increased reserves for
low-socioeconomic tiers. The recent paper by Dur, Kominers, Pathak, and
So¨nmez (2014) makes a similar point regarding the order in which open seats,
and seats reserved for “walk zone” students, are allocated in Boston.
There is another, less relevant, difference between reserves and the Chicago
rule. In Chicago, if any seats are left unfilled then they are again split equally
into reserves for the four ties in a second stage assignment. Our reserves rule
instead opens up the unassigned seats for any type to compete for based on
priorities. The reason why this difference does not matter is that Selective
Enrollment Schools in Chicago are overdemanded: In practice there typically
are no vacant seats.
B.2. Jefferson County. The Jefferson County (KY) School District is promi-
nent in promoting diversity among its schools, and the litigation surrounding
its admissions policies serves partly as a basis for the 2011 US government
guidelines mentioned above. The rules proposed by the county violate the GS
axiom, and therefore would be incompatible with an assignment mechanism
based on the deferred acceptance algorithm, like that in use in Boston, New
York City, or Chicago. We believe that Jefferson County’s objectives could
be satisfied by using one of the rules we propose in this paper–for example,
reserves.
Starting from the early 1970s, the student assignment plan used in Jefferson
County went through major changes. First, in order to avoid segregation, a
racial assignment plan was used and students were bussed to their schools. In
3“A really brutal admissions year,” Chicago Tribune March 3rd, 2012.
4 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
the early 1990s a school choice system was implemented, allowing parents to
state their preferences over schools. In 1996, schools were required to have
between 15 and 50 percent of African American students. In 2002 a lawsuit
was filed against the Jefferson County School District because it had a racial
admissions policy. After a litigation process, the case came before the US
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in 2007 ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
and decided that race cannot be the only factor to use for admissions.
Following this ruling, Jefferson County switched to an assignment plan that
considered the socioeconomic status of parents: Using census data, the school
district divided the county into two regions and required all schools to have
between 15 and 50 percent of their students to be from the first region. This
rule violates GS.
Jefferson County is undergoing yet another change at the moment. The new
assignment plan, which was accepted by the school district to be implemented
in 2013/14 admissions cycle, divides students into three types: Type 1, Type 2,
and Type 3. These types are determined by educational attainment, household
income, and percentage of white residents in the census block group that the
student lives in. Then each school is assigned a diversity index, defined as the
average of student types. The new admissions policy requires each school to
have a diversity index between 1.4 and 2.5.
These two assignment policies are in conflict with the GS axiom, so they
are incompatible with a school choice plan that would seek to install a stable
(or fair) matching. It should be clear, however, that the rules proposed in our
paper can achieve similar objectives to the ones in the current policies, while
satisfying GS.
Appendix C. Controlled School Choice in Other Countries
Policies to enhance diversity can be found in many countries around the
world (Sowell, 2004). Some of these policies implement preferential policies,
whereas some of them implement policies based on quotas. The former re-
semble the reserves rule that we have studied, while the latter are similar to
the quotas model (with regional variations in actual implementation). Many
countries have similar policies, including, but not limited to, Brazil, China,
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Germany, Finland, Macedonia, Malaysia, Norway, Romania, Sri Lanka, and
the United States. Below we discuss two particular examples: college admis-
sions in India and high school admissions in French-speaking Belgium.
C.1. Indian College Admissions. In India the caste system divides society
into hereditary groups or castes (“types” in our model). Historically, it has
enforced a particular division of labor and power in society, and placed severe
limits on socioeconomic mobility. To overcome this, the Indian Constitution
has since 1950 implemented affirmative action. It prescribes that the “sched-
uled castes” (SCs) and “scheduled tribes” (STs) be represented in government
jobs and public universities proportional to their population percentage in the
state that they belong to. These percentages change from state to state. For
example, in Andhra Pradesh, each college allocates 15 percent of its seats
for SCs, 6 percent for STs, 35 percent for other “backward classes,” and the
remaining 44 percent is left open for all students.
The college admissions to these public schools is administered by the state,
and it works as follows. Students take a centralized exam that determines their
ranking. Then students are called one by one to make their choices from the
available colleges. In each college, first the open seats are filled. Afterward the
reserved seats are filled only by students for whom the seats are reserved. This
model corresponds to the situation described above for Chicago. Therefore,
this affirmative action policy fits into our quotas-ideal-point model in which
we replace each school with two copies, the first representing the open seats
and the second representing the rest. For the first copy of the college, each
student is treated the same and the choice rule picks the best available students
regardless of their caste. For the second copy, a choice model based on quotas-
ideal-point model is used. Similarly to the Chicago school district, if a soft
quota policy were used, all students would be weakly better off.
The Indian choice rule can also be generated by reserves in which each
bound is greater than the school’s capacity. But the second copy of the college
implements a choice rule that is generated by the quotas rule described in the
previous paragraph.4
4For an empirical study of affirmative action policies in Andhra Pradesh see Bagde,
Epple, and Taylor (2011).
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C.2. High Schools in French-Speaking Belgium. In French-speaking Bel-
gium, high school admissions are set up to promote diversity. However, in
contrast with many examples we have seen thus far, the target of affirmative
action policy is the set of students who have attended “disadvantaged primary
schools.” The administration announces these primary schools, which may
change each year depending on supply and demand. Each school is required
to reserve at least 15 percent of its seats for students from disadvantaged pri-
mary schools, and also some seats for students living in the neighborhood of
the school. If a reserved seat for either group cannot be filled then it can also
be allocated to other students so long as there is no student from the privileged
group willing to take that seat. This choice corresponds to the reserves model
described above.
Appendix D. Endogenous priorities.
The discussion in Section IIResultssection.2 takes the priority as exoge-
nously given. It may be questionable to have an axiom depending on particu-
lar priorities. Particular priorities depend on particular circumstances (such as
where students live, and their results on test scores), and one many not want
an axiom that is sensible one year, under a particular set of circumstances, but
ceases to be reasonable the following year, when circumstances have changed.
Here we present general characterization results, using axioms that do not
depend on a particular priority and ensure the existence of a priority under
which the axioms of Section IIResultssection.2 hold true.
Type-weak axiom of revealed preference (t-WARP): For any s, s′, S,
and S ′ such that τ(s) = τ(s′) and s, s′ ∈ S ∩ S ′,
s ∈ C(S) and s′ ∈ C(S ′) \ C(S) imply s ∈ C(S ′).
Theorem D.1. A choice rule is generated by an ideal point for some priority
if and only if it satisfies gross substitutes, monotonicity, and type-weak axiom
of revealed preference.
Proof. Suppose that C satisfies the axioms. We shall prove that it is generated
by an ideal point for some priority. To this end, we show that there exist an
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ideal point z∗ and a strict priority  such that the choice function created by
these coincides with C. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma D.1. If C satisfies GS and Mon, then it also satisfies IRS.
Proof. Let C(S ′) ⊆ S ⊆ S ′. By GS, C(S) ⊇ C(S ′). Since S ⊆ S ′, we
have ξ(S) ≤ ξ(S ′) and by Mon, ξ(C(S)) ≤ ξ(C(S ′)). This together with
C(S) ⊇ C(S ′) imply that C(S ′) = C(S), so C satisfies IRS. 
Define f as in the proof of Theorem 1Diversity Firsttheorem.1 and z∗ be
as in the proof of Lemma 2Matching Marketslemma.2. Since f(z∗) = z∗, we
have that ||z∗|| ≤ q. As in the proof of Theorem 1Diversity Firsttheorem.1, f
is generated by ideal point z∗.
Define a binary relation R by saying that s R s′ if τ(s) = τ(s′) and there is
some S 3 s, s′ such that s ∈ C(S) and s′ /∈ C(S). We shall prove that R is
transitive.
Lemma D.2. If C satisfies GS, t-WARP and IRS, then R is transitive.
Proof. Let s R s′ and s′ R s′′; we shall prove that s R s′′. Let S ′ be such
that s′, s′′ ∈ S ′, s′ ∈ C(S ′), and s′′ /∈ C(S ′). Consider the set S ′ ∪ {s}.
First, note that s ∈ C(S ′ ∪ {s}). The reason is that if s /∈ C(S ′ ∪ {s}) then
C(S ′∪{s}) = C(S ′) 3 s′, by IRS. Thus s′Rs, in violation of t-WARP. Second,
note that s′′ /∈ C(S ′∪{s}), as s′′ /∈ C(S ′) and C satisfies gross substitutes. 
The relation R is transitive. Thus it has an extension to a linear order 
over S.
C is generated by z∗ for  because 1) f is generated by the ideal point
z∗ implies ξ(C(S)) is the closest vector to z∗ in B(ξ(S)) for every S and 2)
type-WARP implies that any type-t student in C(S) has a higher priority than
any student in S \ C(S) for every S.
Conversely, let C be generated by ideal point z∗ for . It is immediate that
C satisfies t-WARP. The rest of the proof is exactly the same as in the proof
of Theorem1Diversity Firsttheorem.1. 
Saturated strong axiom of revealed preference (S-SARP): There are
no sequences {sk}Kk=1 and {Sk}Kk=1, of students and sets of students, respec-
tively, such that, for all k
8 ECHENIQUE AND YENMEZ
(1) sk+1 ∈ C(Sk+1) and sk ∈ Sk+1 \ C(Sk+1);
(2) τ(sk+1) = τ(sk) or τ(sk+1) is saturated at Sk+1
(using addition mod K).
S-SARP rules out the existence of certain cycles in revealed preference, but
it is careful as to where it infers a revealed preference from choice. The subtlety
in the definition is the second part that requires either τ(sk+1) = τ(sk) or that
τ(sk+1) is saturated at Sk+1. In the first case, when sk+1 and sk have the same
type, it is revealed that sk+1 has a higher priority than sk. However, when
they have different types, we require that τ(sk+1) is saturated at Sk+1. When
this happens, even though the school could admit fewer type τ(sk+1) students,
it accepts more. Thus, in the revealed preference, sk+1 is preferred to sk even
if they have different types. This axiom allows us to construct a priority order
over students. It is easy to see that S-SARP implies t-WARP.
Theorem D.2. A choice rule is generated by reserves for some priority if
and only if it satisfies gross substitutes, saturated strong axiom of revealed
preference, and acceptance.
Proof. For any x ≤ ξ(S), let F (x) ≡ {ξ(C(S)) : ξ(S) = x} and
fˆ(x) = ∧
f(x)∈F (x)
f(x).
Suppose that C satisfies the axioms. Construct the vector r of minimum
quotas as in the proof of Theorem 2Flexible Diversitytheorem.2. Then |C(S)t| ≥
min{rt, |St|} like before.
Consider the following binary relation. Let s ∗ s′ if there is S, at which
{s} = {s, s′} ∩ C(S) and {s, s′} ⊆ S, and either τ(s) = τ(s′) or τ(s) is
saturated at S. By S-SARP, ∗ has a linear extension  to S.
Third we prove that C is consistent with , as stated in the definition. Let
s ∈ C(S) and s′ ∈ S \ C(S). If τ(s) = τ(s′) then s ∗ s′ by definition of ∗;
hence s  s′. If τ(s) 6= τ(s′) then we need to consider the case when |St| > rt
where t = τ(s). The construction of rt implies that rt = fˆ(|St| , x¯−t) < |St|.
Therefore, there exists S ′ ⊆ S such that if
S ′ = St ∪
(
∪t˜6=tS t˜
)
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then S ′t \ C(S ′)t 6= ∅. Thus t is saturated at S. Since s ∈ C(S) and s′ ∈
S \ C(S), we get s  s′, as  extends ∗.
It remains to show that if C is generated by reserves for some priority, then it
satisfies the axioms. It is immediate that it satisfies Acceptance and S-SARP.
That C satisfies GS is in the proof of Theorem 2Flexible Diversitytheorem.2.

Demanded strong axiom of revealed preference (D-SARP): There
are no sequences {sk}Kk=1 and {Sk}Kk=1, of students and sets of students, re-
spectively, such that, for all k
(1) sk+1 ∈ C(Sk+1) and sk ∈ Sk+1 \ C(Sk+1);
(2) τ(sk+1) = τ(sk) or τ(sk) is demanded in Sk+1.
(using addition mod K).
D-SARP rules out cycles in the revealed preference of the choice rule, where
again we are careful as to when we infer the existence of a revealed preference.
It is stronger than t-WARP. The difference between D-SARP and S-SARP is
the second component of the definition, sk+1 is revealed preferred to sk only
when τ(sk) is demanded in Sk+1 implying that the school could choose more
type τ(sk) students out of Sk+1.
Theorem D.3. A choice rule is generated by quotas for some priority if and
only if it satisfies gross substitutes, rejection maximality, and demanded strong
axiom of revealed preference.
Proof. Suppose that C satisfies the axioms. Define rt as in the proof of Theo-
rem 3Flexible Diversitytheorem.3. In addition, define ∗ as follows: s ∗ s′ if
there exists S ⊇ {s, s′} such that s ∈ C(S), s′ /∈ C(S) and either τ(s) = τ(s′)
or τ(s′) is demanded in S. By D-SARP, ∗ has a linear extension  to S.
To show that C is generated by quotas for some priority we need to show
three things. First, we need |C(S)t| ≤ rt for every S ⊆ S, which follows from
the construction of rt.
Second we show that if s ∈ C(S), s′ ∈ S \C(S) and s′  s, then it must be
the case that τ(s) 6= τ(s′) and ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ = rτ(s′). If τ(s) = τ(s′), then s ∗ s′
and s  s′, which is a contradiction with the fact that  is an extension of
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∗. So τ(s) 6= τ(s′). To prove that ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ = rτ(s′) suppose, towards a
contradiction, that
∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ 6= rτ(s′), so ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ < rτ(s′).
We shall prove that τ(s′) is demanded in S, which will yield the desired
contradiction by D-SARP, as  is an extension of ∗. Let S ′ ≡ Sτ(s′). We
consider three cases.
• First, |C(S ′)| = q then ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ < ∣∣C(S ′)τ(s′)∣∣ (as s ∈ C(S) and
τ(s) 6= τ(s′)), so τ(s′) is demanded in S.
• Second, consider the case when |C(S ′)| < q and |C(S ′)| < |S ′|. Then,
by Lemma 5Proof of Theorem 3Flexible Diversitytheorem.3lemma.5,
|C(S ′)| = rτ(s′), so |C(S ′)| >
∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣. Hence τ(s′) is demanded in
S.
• Third, consider the case when |C(S ′)| < q, and |C(S ′)| = |S ′|. Then
|C(S ′)| > ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣, as s′ ∈ Sτ(s′) \C(S)τ(s′). Thus τ(s′) is demanded
in S.
In all three cases we conclude that s ∗ s′. Since  is a linear extension of
∗, we get s  s′, a contradiction.
Finally, we need to show that if s ∈ S \ C(S), then either |C(S)| = q or∣∣C(S)τ(s)∣∣ = rτ(s). This is in the proof of Theorem 3Flexible Diversitytheorem.3.
To finish the proof, suppose that C is generated by quotas for some priority.
Then it is easy to see that C satisfies RM and D-SARP. The proof that C
satisfies GS is in the proof of Theorem 3Flexible Diversitytheorem.3. 
Appendix E. A General Comparative Static
Definition E.1. Choice rule C is path independent if for every S and S ′,
C(S ∪ S ′) = C(S ∪ C(S ′)).
Definition E.2. A choice rule is an expansion of another choice rule if,
for any set of students, any student chosen by the latter is also chosen by the
former. (C ′ is an expansion of C is for every set S, C ′(S) ⊇ C(S).)
For matching markets, stability has proved to be a useful solution con-
cept because mechanisms that find stable matchings are successful in practice
(Roth, 2008). Moreover, finding stable matchings is relatively easy. In partic-
ular, the deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) of Gale and Shapley (1962) finds
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a stable matching, and DA has other attractive properties.5 Therefore, it also
serves as a recipe for market design. For example, it has been adapted by the
New York and Boston school districts (see Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and
So¨nmez (2005) and Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2009)). For complete-
ness, we provide a description of the student-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm.
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)
Step 1: Each student applies to her most preferred school. Suppose that
S1c is the set of students who applied to school c. School c tentatively
admits students in Cc(S
1
c ) and permanently rejects the rest. If there
are no rejections, stop.
Step k: Each student who was rejected at Step k − 1 applies to her
next preferred school. Suppose that Skc is the set of new applicants
and students tentatively admitted at the end of Step k−1 for school c.
School c tentatively admits students in Cc(S
k
c ) and permanently rejects
the rest. If there are no rejections, stop.
The algorithm ends in finite time since at least one student is rejected at
each step. When choice rules are path independent, DA produces the student-
optimal stable matching (Roth, 1984; Aygu¨n and So¨nmez, 2013; Chambers
and Yenmez, 2013). Therefore, the student-optimal stable mechanism (SOSM)
coincides with DA.
Theorem E.1. Suppose that for each school c, Cc is path independent and
C ′c is a path-independent expansion of Cc. Then all students weakly prefer the
outcome of SOSM with (C ′c)c∈C to the outcome with (Cc)c∈C.
Proof. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma E.1. If C satisfies GS and (c, S) blocks a matching µ, then for every
s ∈ S \ µ(c), (c, {s}) blocks µ.
Proof. Since (c, S) blocks µ, we have S ⊆ Cc(µ(c) ∪ S). Let s ∈ S \ µ(c), by
substitutability s ∈ C(µ(c)∪ S) implies s ∈ C(µ(c)∪ {s}). Therefore, (c, {s})
blocks µ. 
5For a history of the deferred acceptance algorithm, see Roth (2008).
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Since we use two different choice rule profiles and stability depends on the
choice rules, we prefix the choice rule profile to stability, individual ratio-
nality and no blocking to avoid confusion. For example, we use C-stability,
C-individual rationality and C-no blocking.
DA produces the student-optimal stable matching (Roth and Sotomayor,
1990). Denote the student-optimal stable matching with C and C ′ by µ and
µ′, respectively. Since Cc(µ(c)) = µ(c) by C-individual rationality of µ by
every school c, C ′c(µ(c)) ⊇ Cc(µ(c)) by the assumption, and C ′c(µ(c)) ⊆ µ(c)
by definition of the choice rule we get C ′(µ(c)) = µ(c). Therefore, µ is also
C ′-individually rational for schools. Since student preference profile is fixed,
µ is also C ′-individually rational for students. If µ is a C ′-stable matching,
then µ′ Pareto dominates µ since µ′ is the student-optimal C ′-stable matching.
Otherwise, if µ is not a C ′-stable matching, then there exists a C ′-blocking
pair. Whenever there exists such a blocking pair, there also exists a blocking
pair consisting a school and a student by Lemma E.1. In such a situation, we
apply the following improvement algorithm. Let µ0 ≡ µ.
Step k: Consider blocking pairs involving school ck and students who
would like to switch to ck, say S
k
ck
≡ {s : ck s µk−1(s)}. School ck
accepts C ′ck(µ
k−1(ck) ∪ Skck) and rejects the rest of the students. Let
µk(ck) ≡ C ′ck(µk−1(ck) ∪ Skck) and µk(c) ≡ µk−1(c) \C ′ck(µk−1(ck) ∪ Skck)
for c 6= ck. If there are no more blocking pairs, then stop and return
µk, otherwise go to Step k + 1.
We first prove by induction that no previously admitted student is ever
rejected in the improvement algorithm. For the base case when k = 1 note
that C ′c1(µ(c1)∪ S1c1) ⊇ Cc1(µ(c1)∪ S1c1) by assumption and Cc1(µ(c1)∪ S1c1) =
µ(c1) since µ is C-stable. Therefore, C
′(µ(c1) ∪ S1c1) ⊇ µ(c1), which implies
that no students are rejected at the first stage of the algorithm. Assume, by
mathematical induction hypothesis, that no students are rejected during Steps
1 through k − 1 of the improvement algorithm. We prove that no student is
rejected at Step k. There are two cases to consider.
First, consider the case when cn 6= ck for all n ≤ k − 1. Since µ is C-
stable, we have Cck(µ(ck) ∪ Skck) = µ(ck) (as students in Skck prefer ck to their
schools in µ). By assumption, C ′ck(µ(ck)∪Skck) ⊇ Cck(µ(ck)∪Skck) which implies
CONTROL CONTROLLED 13
C ′ck(µ(ck)∪Skck) ⊇ µ(ck). Since µ(ck) ⊇ µk−1(ck) we have C ′ck(µk−1(ck)∪Skck) ⊇
µk−1(ck) by substitutability. In this case no student is rejected at Step k.
Second, consider the case when ck = cn for some n ≤ k−1. Let n∗ be the last
step smaller than k in which school ck was considered. Since each student’s
match is either the same or improved at Steps 1 through k − 1, we have
µn
∗−1(ck) ∪ Sn∗ck ⊇ µk−1(ck) ∪ Skck . By construction, µn
∗
(ck) = C
′
ck
(µn
∗−1(ck) ∪
Sn
∗
ck
) which implies µk−1(ck) ⊆ C ′ck(µk−1(ck) ∪ Skck) by substitutability and the
fact that µn
∗
(ck) ⊇ µk−1(ck) (since n∗ is the last step before k in which school
ck is considered). Therefore, no student is rejected at Step k.
Since no student is ever rejected by the improvement algorithm, it ends in a
finite number of steps. Moreover, the resulting matching does not have any C ′-
blocking pair. By construction, it is also C ′-individually rational. This shows
that there exists a C ′-stable matching that Pareto dominates µ. Since µ′ is
the student-optimal C ′-stable matching, we have that µ′ Pareto dominates µ
for students. 
Appendix F. Independence of Axioms
Here, we check the independence of axioms that are used in Theorems 1Di-
versity Firsttheorem.1-D.3. The following axiom is useful in our examples
below.
Axiom F.1. Choice rule C satisfies the strong axiom of revealed pref-
erence (SARP) if there are no sequences {sk}Kk=1 and {Sk}Kk=1, of students
and sets of students, respectively, such that, for all k
(1) sk+1 ∈ C(Sk+1) and sk ∈ Sk+1 \ C(Sk+1).
(using addition mod K).
SARP is stronger than both D-SARP and S-SARP.
Axioms in Theorem D.1.
Example 1 (GS, t-WARP but not Mon). Let S = {s1, s2, s3}, q = 2,
and τ(s1) = τ(s2) = τ(s3) = t. Consider the following choice function:
C(s1, s2, s3) = C(s1, s2) = C(s1, s3) = C(s1) = {s1}, C(s2, s3) = {s2, s3},
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C(s2) = {s2}, and C(s3) = {s3}.6 Clearly, C satisfies both GS and t-
WARP. But it fails Mon since |{s1, s2, s3}t| ≥ |{s2, s3}t| but |C(s1, s2, s3)t| <
|C(s2, s3)t|.
Example 2 (t-WARP, Mon but not GS). Let S = {s1, s2, s3}, τ(s1) =
τ(s2) = t1, τ(s3) = t2. Consider the following choice function: C(s1, s2) = {s1}
and C(S) = S for the remaining S. C satisfies t-WARP and Mon. But it fails
GS because s2 ∈ C(s1, s2, s3) and s2 /∈ C(s1, s2).
Example 3 (Mon, GS but not t-WARP). Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, q = 2,
and τ(s1) = τ(s2) = τ(s3) = τ(s4) = t. Consider the following choice func-
tion: C(s1, s2, s3, s4) = C(s1, s2, s3) = C(s1, s2, s4) = {s1, s2}, C(s1, s3, s4) =
{s1, s3}, C(s2, s3, s4) = {s2, s4}, and C(S) = S for the remaining S. C satisfies
Mon and GS. But it fails t-WARP because s3 ∈ C(s1, s3, s4)\C(s2, s3, s4) and
s4 ∈ C(s2, s3, s4) \ C(s1, s3, s4).
Axioms in Theorem D.2.
Example 4 (GS, S-SARP but not Acceptance). Consider the choice func-
tion in Example 1. C satisfies both GS and SARP (and hence S-SARP). But
it fails acceptance since |C(s1, s2, s3)| = 1 < 2 = q.
Example 5 (S-SARP, Acceptance but not GS). Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}
and T = {t1, t2}. Suppose that s1 and s2 are of type t1 and the rest of type
t2. Let the capacity of the school be 2 and the choice be:
C(S) =

S if |S| ≤ 2
{s1, s2} if {s1, s2} ⊆ S
{s3, s4} otherwise.
Note that C violates GS because s1 /∈ C(s1, s3, s4) while s1 ∈ C(s1, s2, s3, s4).
However, C satisfies acceptance and S-SARP. Acceptance is obvious. To see
that it satisfies S-SARP, let R be the revealed preference relation, where xRy
if there is S such that x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S \ C(S), and either x and y are of
the same type or the type of x is saturated in S.
6For ease of notation we write C(si, . . . , sj) for C({si, . . . , sj}).
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We can only infer x R y when there is S with S \ C(S) 6= ∅. So we can
focus in S with S ≥ 3. There are four such sets. When |St1| = 2 we have
St1 \ C(S)t1 = ∅, so t1 is never saturated at any S with |St1| = 2. Therefore
we cannot infer any xRy from any S with {s1, s2} ⊆ S. Thus we are only left
with the facts that
{s3, s4} = C(s1, s3, s4) = C(s2, s3, s4).
That is, s3 R s1, s3 R s2, s4 R s1, and s4 R s2. Such R is acyclic. So S-SARP
is satisfied.
Example 6 (Acceptance, GS but not S-SARP). Consider choice function
C introduced in Example 3. We showed that C satisfies GS but fails t-WARP.
Since S-SARP is stronger than t-WARP, S-SARP is also violated. It is easy
to check that C also satisfies acceptance.
Axioms in Theorem D.3.
Example 7 (GS, D-SARP but not RM). Consider the choice function in
Example 1. C satisfies both GS and SARP (and hence D-SARP). But it fails
RM since s2 ∈ {s1, s2} \ C(s1, s2) and |C(s1, s2)| < q = 2 but |C(s1, s2)t| <
|C(s2, s3)t|.
Example 8 (D-SARP, RM but not GS). Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, q = 2,
and τ(s1) = τ(s2) = τ(s3) = t1 and τ(s4) = t2. Consider the following
choice function: C(s1, s2, s3, s4) = C(s1, s2, s3) = {s1, s2}, C(s1, s2, s4) =
C(s1, s3, s4) = {s1, s4}, C(s2, s3, s4) = {s2, s4}, C(s1, s2) = C(s1, s3) = {s1},
C(s2, s3) = {s2}, and C(S) = S for the remaining S.
Let  be defined as follows: s  s′ if there exists S ⊇ {s, s′} such that
s ∈ C(S), s′ /∈ C(S) and either τ(s) = τ(s′) or τ(s′) is demanded in S. We
consider every set of students from which a student is rejected and deduce that
s1 > s2 > s3, s4. Since there are no cycles, D-SARP is satisfied. It is easy to
see that RM is also satisfied. To see that GS fails, note s2 ∈ C(s1, s2, s3, s4)
and s2 /∈ C(s1, s2, s4).
Example 9 (RM, GS but not D-SARP). Consider choice function C in-
troduced in Example 3. C satisfies GS but it fails t-WARP. Since D-SARP
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is stronger than t-WARP, D-SARP is also not satisfied. In addition, C also
satisfies acceptance, which implies RM.
Axioms in Theorem 1.
Example 10 (GS, within-type -compatibility but not Mon). Consider
choice function C introduced in Example 1. Let  be as follows: s1  s2  s3.
Clearly, C satisfies both GS and within-type -compatibility. But it fails Mon.
Example 11 (Within-type -compatibility, Mon but not GS). Consider
choice function C introduced in Example 2. Let  be as follows: s1  s2  s3.
Clearly, C satisfies both within-type -compatibility and Mon. But it fails
GS.
Example 12 (Mon, GS but not within-type -compatibility). Consider
choice function C introduced in Example 3. It satisfies Mon and GS but fails
t-WARP. Therefore, it fails within-type -compatibility for any .
Axioms in Theorem 2.
Example 13 (GS, saturated -compatibility but not acceptance). Con-
sider the choice function in Example 1. Let  be as follows: s1  s2  s3.
C satisfies GS and saturated -compatibility. But it fails acceptance since
|C(s1, s2, s3)| = 1 < 2 = q.
Example 14 (Saturated -compatibility, acceptance but not GS). Con-
sider the choice function in Example 5. Let  be as follows: s3  s4 
s1  s2. It is clear by the argument in Example 5 that C satisfies saturated
-compatibility because  agrees with the revealed preference constructed
therein. In addition, C also satisfies acceptance. But it fails GS as shown in
Example 5.
Example 15 (Acceptance, GS but not saturated -compatibility). Con-
sider the choice function in Example 3 but suppose that all students have
different types. C satisfies acceptance and GS. But it fails saturated -
compatibility: τ(s3) is saturated in {s1, s3, s4}, s3 ∈ C(s1, s3, s4) and s4 /∈
C(s1, s3, s4) imply s3  s4. On the other hand, τ(s4) is saturated in {s2, s3, s4},
s4 ∈ C(s2, s3, s4) and s3 /∈ C(s2, s3, s4) imply s4  s3. Therefore, C cannot
satisfy saturated -compatibility for any .
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Axioms in Theorem 3.
Example 16 (GS, within-type -compatibility, demanded -compatibility
but not RM). Consider the choice function in Example 1. Let be as follows:
s1  s2  s3. As argued in Example 6, C satisfies GS but fails RM. Moreover,
it satisfies within-type -compatibility and demanded -compatibility.
Example 17 (Within-type -compatibility, demanded -compatibility,
RM but not GS). Consider the choice function in Example 8. Let  be as
follows: s1  s2  s3  s4. As argued in Example 8, C satisfies RM but fails
GS. Clearly it satisfies within-type -compatibility. Let us now check satu-
rated -compatibility: the only sets in which a lower priority student is chosen
over a higher priority student are {s1, s2, s4}, {s1, s3, s4}, and {s2, s3, s4}. But
s2 is not demanded for {s1, s2, s4}, s3 is not demanded for {s1, s3, s4} and s3
is not demanded for {s2, s3, s4}. Therefore, demanded -compatibility is also
satisfied.
Example 18 (Demanded -compatibility, RM, GS but not within-type
-compatibility). Consider the choice function in Example 3. C satisfies
GS as argued in Example 3 and it satisfies RM as argued in Example 9.
Since there is only one type and this type is never demanded in a set, C also
satisfies demanded -compatibility for any . However, it fails within-type
-compatibility because it fails t-WARP as shown in Example 3.
Example 19 (RM, GS, within-type -compatibility but not demanded
-compatibility). Consider the choice function in Example 3 but suppose
that all students have different types. C satisfies GS as argued in Example 3
and it satisfies RM as argued in Example 9. It trivially satisfies within-type -
compatibility because all students have different types. But it fails demanded
-compatibility for any  because τ(s4) is demanded in {s1, s3, s4}, so we
need s3  s4. On the other hand, τ(s3) is demanded in {s2, s3, s4}, so we need
s4  s3.
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